Leslie Scalapino

The Wedge—Chapter 5 of Secret Autobiography

                                                                                    5. The wedge

       It can't be 'our' 'happiness.' Because that conceptualizing is a social uniformity where the individual is transformed in order 'to appear' oneself and also the same as the crowd (at once).
       One's own appearance is as outside only, inside having been consumed by the worm-pod-flower.
       Destroys the inside of others &—by displacing 'one's' experiencing and 'one's' theorizing that both.
       quot;I am the business" is said by the Replicant who learns her identity having thought she was human (in Blade Runner). 'Not recognizing that one is constructed' is the capitalist-business. It displaces actual outside event, redefining history, obliterating those past and current events.
       So Secret Autobiography has to be not outside event, not a life's chronological events, and not one's imagining-thought-conceptualizing event mind-phenomena (as that is only 'oneself')—it's event that 'doesn't come from one's mind' but as comes from one's mind. You replace any event not creating it. What is 'not imposition' (any event being imposition as such) isn't between these even—but 'not imposition' can be. And as this is conceptual, all events in it could only occur from the mind of one.

       Secret Autobiography is not the constructed self, or constructed mind (as its operations even, which are, though, creating the writing). Nor is it the phenomena (subject) by itself.
       The ripping off of the colony ('its' definition), the occupied people being defined exteriorly as members 'of' the whole (yet marginalized 'to' that 'the only world'), the colonized's wealth stolen and shipped to the 'parent' (military invader) while 'its' (colonized) people are being executed, replaced, shipped to labor camps—still executed—language replacing them defining the events according to the defined outside version—their resources mined, they are replaced with occupying workers (invaders) who own the stores and towns and work the resources that are being shipped away. So there is no work either, for the occupied.
       The occupied are regarded as uncivilized, not-human. They (these others) are more than human in the sense of being outside of their lives as conceptual-physiological—they theorize themselves as 'outside of construction by being constructed only', seeing being constructed continually.
       In waking at night ('state' in) terror that one (young adult) 'hadn't lived' 'was not living' then at that instant at night (it is impossible to do so ever) before terror is subject to the experience there—the experience is something else.
       The exterior and interiorized event both is unformed only (by one?)—nor is terror a cause of it (is before it, after it).
       That 'it's not causal' is characteristic of terror—it may not have an effect on 'crowds that are in violence so it's outside one while one's there.'

       If one's liked that's a 'thing' itself. Others are re-formed to like one, if one's doing that.

       quot;That's what it is to be a slave." 'But the only way of being outside.' In total change, the butterfly has no memory as it's structurally totally different.
In the one who experienced this (total structural change) there is still terror, or isn't?
       Eating a mango—language isn't existing, at all, and that only as text. Here. 'Written' is secret. Vision occurs by it being written. Not spoken (spoken is 'public')—yet it is also 'public' later by being unspoken, in the sense of that which is 'unspeakable' but is occurring 'there'.
       In being pressed the spinal cord memorized pain (that is thoughts), still feels that pain when the 'source' is gone. Memory is one being both the one eating and the one being eaten at once while the butterfly and its worm are at once, superimposed as each other, only. Throughout one entirely then.
       Is dying, only. (So that can't be. One isn't the occurrence of 'dying, only.' That is felt by one, when living, but it can't be 'dying only') Relation of 'the inside of the inside' to dying—or 'the outside to one' to dying.

       It's qualified everywhere. Eating the mango. Seeing T singing.
       Someone else saying to me, because this does not have the ground that he accepts, which is the very ground I'm trying to reverse, it cannot be regarded as valid (he says it's "too fast"), "isn't qualified." And I can only 'reverse it' by not having any of its terms, thus told one can't speak there because it's not the same thing.
       One wouldn't seek to engage terror, that would anyway be a conception that is the experience then, one only doing so when one is in that—yet if one actually seeks not to, it may be also that one precludes that event, but only that one doesn't know that then. He is separating himself, objectifying so there is nothing seen except the way he plots something.

       I was going to say that I won't do this any more because people don't like it—How? (in reference to them).
       A barrier of language is there (indicated by the man taking issue with my mixing 'discursive' with 'poetic' as if fact is different from 'writing'—his basis of fact) as that which is 'only that is' credible—when one is speaking as logic at all.
       It seems to be mirroring his, unintentionally. I don't know his until it's there. He discounts mine automatically. I do have to seek his, in order to change it in the outside by it's being written.
       One's to engage as format 'thought' as the declaration socially that that is 'thought.' Though to question that would be 'thought'.
       Alice attempts to apply imperial England's logic continually to interpret what's going on in Wonderland. It's the same as applying imperial England's logic. Opposite is compatible. (In Alice's scheme also, as here.)
       One stream 'opposing' another stream, streams are simultaneous, to be dis-placing all. The conception of 'an outside-culture'—is used as a wedge. Nagarjuna's logic*, for example, is such a wedge: the outside-culture is space which displaces itself. Only. It displaces here also. It could be a way to dismantle us, to displace any interior construct (any construct being rigidity now).
       'Conceptual' is 'appearance' and the 'interior being' of a culture, and instructions in the chromosomes. 'Conceptual' occurs by being cues, but is not the same as these cues.

       Frightened (young) at early recognition, which was—one 'theorized "every instance has to die" '—later becomes, 'have to travel continually, not return to anything or repeat—as have to die'—is one's introduction of change now.
       This interior change in one can't be, isn't, arrived at mechanistically. That is, isn't duplication. There's only actions now—and thus terror is 'there are no actions in the present moment or ever'—even while these are occurring in life.

       As here we can only do anything at all with humor—if it isn't funny, it's unhappy—that's unhappy to think—it's not right tonally, in fact. So if one's inner life is to transmogrify in any instant—everyone—is 'unintentionally' 'as one's inner life' disingenuous? There (the foreign place or concept used as a wedge) wouldn't be.

       The flaneur, the detached stroller, no longer exists. Instead, individuals on all economic and class levels at once are both seeing and creating the interaction that is them: which is then exterior, is 'society' (that is, the illusion of simultaneity). Media 'fosters' and is this appearance. Geographical land/location is also physiological-conceptual 'seen' both as a product owned by people and a landscape in which people transpire—thus seen simultaneously as an origin of people (but it isn't). "Dependent origination" itself (that occurrences are interactive, have no independent being, as described by Nagarjuna) is itself illusion. (Nagarjuna's logic would concur with this.)
       In other words, social phenomena 'seem to' 'transpire'—and that 'seeming' is itself the origin of other events.

       *Example, interpretation of Nagarjuna's logic: roses only qualify the rose horizon. As such they are two separate things: in that anything seen 'from' oneself is only in that one moment (which isn't existing either, that moment or oneself then), is 'only' 'composed'. The roses are not related to a rose horizon inherently, in that they are dependent on one seeing them in that way at an instant.
       One also doesn't exist 'as that,' not inherent as that one seeing (who is not separate in memory, but is dependent on that instant existence of the roses). An occurrence is not separate in existence, is then inherently empty in not having any instant—yet the occurrence appears to be transpiring.

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